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Summary findings
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I.  Introduction
Most analyses of developing countries' export perfomance  over the last two or
three decades recognize the importance of the United States as a market for their manufactures
exports.  According to UNCTAD (1990, Table A13), approximately one-half of all developing
countries' exports of manufactured goods destined for OECD markets make their way to the
United States, with  the European Community (EC) and European Free  Trade Association
(EFTA) combined receiving only about one-third.'  The capacity of the US market to absorb
imports is remarkable, especially  when one notes that most measures of market size favor OECD
Europe; i.e.,  the latter's population is about one-third greater than that of the United States and
its gross domestic product is about 15 percent larger. 2 Viewed in a historical perspective, the
United States was the "springboard" that newly industrialized Asian economies (NIEs) used in
order to gain access to inernational markets.  During the 1960s, for example, approximately
three-quarters of manufactures exported from the Republc of Korea and Taiwan (China) to the
OECD went to the United States.  Although this proportion declined in the last two decades, it
still  stands at  about  50  percent for  the  four Asian  NEEs combined (Korea, Hong  Kong,
Sigapore,  and Taiwan (China)) as well as for al  the developing economies of the East Asian
I  With the cory  into force of the Maasricht Treaty on November 1, 1993, the European Community  (EC)
became part of the European Union (EU).  EU is now the term of choice for references to EC activities.  In this
text, however, the conventional  acronym (EC) is used.
2  In 1988,  UNCTAD (1990, Table 7. 1) estimated  that US imports  of manufacts  from developing  countries
were about 4.1 percent of apparent consumption  (production minus exports plus impo,.s) compared to about 2.9
percent  nthe  EC.  For key product gmups like cloding,  28 percent of US apparen  consumption originated in
developing  countrics as opposed  to 19 percent for the EC.  Yeats (1989) found  that the United States imports over
40 percent of all labor-intensive  manufaum  from developing countrm while the cormsponding  share for dte EC
was 12  percent-  As a result, US per capita imports from developing  countries  were about S250  as opposed to $100
for the EC.2
region.  In terms of all products shipped from countries in this region (manufactures, foods,
energy, etc.), the United States is the second most important destination (East Asian intra-trade
ranks first) accounting for one-quarter of total East Asia's exports-see Appendix I, Table Al.
In view of the key role that the United States has played as an outlet for East
Asian and other developing economies' exports, there  are clearly reasons for concern with
regard  to  North  Amencan  regional integration initiatives.  The recently-concluded North
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), for example, combines the United States, Canada, and
Mexico into a single market whose trade restrictions will displace (divert) exports from third
countries. 3 There  are  also  discussions about  extending the  arrangement  throughout  the
Americas. 4
A frequent deficiency with much of the discussion and analyses of the (adverse)
third country effects of arrangements like NAFTA is that it lacks empirical information on the
magnitude of trade changes that could result.  Our goal in this investigation is to summarize and
evaluate the empirical information  that exists on NAFTA's impact on nomnembers. In addition,
3  See Erzan and Yeats (1992)  for estimates of the increases in exports Latin American countries could
experience from free tade  arrangpments  (FTAs) with the United States.  It should be noted that the US emphasis
has been on the establishment  of free trade areas and not customs unions. The latter involves two or more countries
which abolish all, or nearly all, tride restrictions  among themselves  and set up a common  barrier against outsiders.
The EC is  an example of this type of arrangement.  Once the arrangement expands beyond trade  in goods,
encompassing  trade in services and the movement  of factors of production, it is referred to as a common market-
e.g.., the 1992 European Single Market program.  In a free trade area, trade among member countries is completely
libealized,  or nearly so, but therc is not a common trade barrier against nonmember  countries; each country is free
to  impose its own trade  restrictions against third parties.  The EFTA  is an example of  this  latter type of
anungement.  Prima Braga and Yeats (1992) estimate that FTAs, customs unions and coamon  markets already
covered approximately  45 percent of world trade and 50 percent of world trade in manufactures  by the late 1980s.
4  The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) of the Bush Administration was interpreted in Latin
America and the Caribbean as suggesting that NAFTA would be a first stcp towards hemispheric integration.  In
reality, however, the accession clause of NAFTA (Article 2205) does not confine eligibility for membership to
countries in the Westen  Hemisphere.  Moreover, it seems that an eventual widening of NAFTA wili at best be a
slow moving process.3
using a trade projection model developed  jointly by the World Bank and UNCTAD (1989) and
a gravity flow model developed for this project, we produce additional information about the
likely impact on the developing economies of East Asia.  East Asia was chosen for study due
to  its heavy reliance on the North American market, and the fact that the region produces a
relatively wide range of labor-intensive  manufactures that often face important North American
trade barriers.  High trade barriers are one precondition for NAFTA to divert third countries'
exports.
II.  Quantitative Analysis of NAFTA's Third Country Effects
NAFTA's  economic impacts on non-member countries broadly  include: trade
diversion, terms-of-trade changes, investment diversion, and the positive externalities associated
with the "growth dividend."  Several quantitative  studies focusing on the NAFTA have appeared
lately and they extend the findings of analyses produced during the debate on the United States-
Canada FTA.s  This section summarizes the aggregate and sectoral level results derived from
some of these models and also evaluates the fimdings  of several studies that employed partial
equilibrium trade models.
A.  Partial Equilibrium Analyses: The Aggreate  Picture
Partial  equilibrium analyses of the  NAFTA suggest that it will not  generate
significant trade diversion  from non-member  countries. Laird (1990) for instance, employs 1983
5  Brown and Stem (1991) provide a useful review of stmdies  which analyzed the impact of the Canada-US
FTA. See Hufbaner and Shott (1993) for a summary of the potential  effects of NAFTA.  Section II here relies on
Primo  Braga  (1992).4
trade flows and calculates that NAFTA (modeled as  simply entailing tariff  removal among
member countries) would re¶ult in a reduction of less than three-quarters of one per cent in the
value of exports to the United States from the other countries in the Western Heniisphere.  For
all industrialized countries, a NAFTA limited to tariff elimination would result in a reduction
of only one half of one per fent of their exports to the United States.
Laird also estimates  NAFTA's trade expansion  effect (i.e., the summation of trade
creation and trade diversion).  under the assumption that the agreement would be implemented in
tandem with a liberalization  jn trade barriers achieved by the Uruguay Round negotiations. His
assumptions concerning the results of the Round were: a 20 per cent reduction in tariffs and
NTBs affecting agriculure;  the elimination of MFA quotas, while textile and clothing tariffs
remain  at present  levels;  ad  tariffs  for  all  other  products  are  reduced  by  30  per  cent  with
remaining NTBs being left untouched. Under these conditions, trade creation (magnified by the
MIFN Uruguay Round  liberalization) completely dominates trade  diversion  resulting from
NAFTA.  The developing countries in the Western Hemisphere would experience a 1.8 per cent
increase in their exports to the United States while there would be a 2.4 per cent increase for
all industialized countries. If the results of the Uruguay Round are estmated in connection with
a NAFTA that encompasses the complete removal of both tariffs and NTBs among its member
countries, the final outcom4 is marginal:  exports to the United States would decline by only
0.07 per cent in the case of the WNestern  Hemisphere developing countries (and would expand
by 1.6 percent for industrial countries).
A second aggregate partial equilibrium study also confis  NAFTA's  limited
potential for trade diversion with respect to other Western Hemisphere countries and that the5
total amount of all countries' trade diverted is likely to be small.  Focusing on an FTA between
Mexico and the United States, Erzan and Yeats (1992) find that 94 percent of the total trade
diversion would affect countries outside the Western Hemisphere.  They also conclude that the
total amount of trade diversion by NAFTA (estimated to be around US$441 million in terms of
1986 trade flows) amounts to about one-half a percent of US imports from the non-members.
Over 85 percent of the diverted trade consists of manufactured gdods with about $35 million (8
percent) classified as foods and feeds.  These projections were based on £he  assumption of zero
duties in all tariff  lines and the adjustment of NTBs to accommodate the (tariff prefcrence-
induced) trade expansion.
In  a third partial equilibrium study that examined NAFTA's  impact on  South1
Asian exporters, Safadi and Yeats (1992) conclude that exports fKom  the latter might decline by
a maximum of one percent and that, due to the very different composition of Canada-Mexico
and South Asia's exports to the United States, most of the trade losses would be concentrated
in textiles and clothing.  Safadi and Yeats also uncover evidence -of Mexican supply constraints
in these sectors-like  a history of unfilled MFA quotas-that  suggests Mexico may not be able
to fully utilize the competitive advantages associated with NAFT7A's  trade preferences (Safadi
and Yeats' analysis is based on a preferential removal of all tariffs and NTBs).  The authors also
concluded that a successful completion of the Uruguay Round would significantly reduce the
(already small) South Asian trade losses since the MTN would cut  the preferential margins
NAFTA could provide member states.6
B.  Conmputable  General Equilibrium (CGE) Analyses
The results of studies using CGE models for analysis of the third country effects
of NAFTA are quite sensitive to model specifications (particularly, elasticities of demand and
supply, market structures, pricing behavior of firms, and assumptions about capital flows).  It
is also important to noe  that assumptions concerning the nature of the preferential liberalization
NAFTA will achieve vary significantly from study to study.'
Available CGE studies--for a detailed review, see Brown (1992)--., pically find
(as expected) that trade expands among the NAFTA member countries as a consequence of the
preferential arrangement.  Welfare effects are also found to be positive for the participating
countries, tending to be larger in models which adopt assumptions of increasing remms to scale
vis-a-vis those based on constant returns to scale.
The impact on non-member  countries, in turn, may be either negative or positive
depending on how the model treats the interplay between trade diversion, capital flows and
changes in the terms-of-trade for the rest of the world.  It is worth mentioning that the latter is
usuaLly  introduced in these models via postulated export supply and import demand functions
based on relative prices.  Table  I  summarizes the main results for the  "rest of the  world"
(ROW) as established in the models dcveloped  by Brown, Deardorff, and Stem (BDS) (1992),
Sobarzo (1992), and Cox and Harris (1992).  These models allow for increasing returns to scale
and assume that imperfectly competitive finns set prices either through a combination of focal
6  This section focuses  on CGE models which explicitly  address the NAFTA. There are numerous other CGE
exercises which focus, for instance, on a US-Mexico FTA. Their results, however, are not at odds with the main
conclusions presented here, as far as the economic implications for the third countries are concemed.  See,  for
instance, Hinojosa-Ojeda  and Robinson (1991) or Bachrach  and Mizrahi (1992).7
pricing and  monopolistic competition (Sobarzo, Cox and Harrib) or  in a  pure  monopolistic
competitive fashion (BDS).
Preferential liberalization without international factor mobility reduces the trade
volumes between NAFTA and third countries, and as illustrated by Case 1 of the BDS model,
this may result in deterioration in the terms of trade of the latter.  NAFTA's demand for imports
from non-member countries and.  the s!upply  of exports from NAFTA to the rest of the world fall
as a result.  The cases summarized in Table 1, however, show that the size of these changes is
not likely to be significant.  The exceptions occur  in scenarios in which international capital
mobility is allowed for  (case 2,  both  in BDS and in Sobaizo) or  in which the preferential
liberalization is complemented by additional trade barriers against non-participants (case 3 in
Cox and Harris).
Case 2  in  BDS assumes that,  in  parallel  with  NAFTA's  preferential  trade
liberalization, Mexico relaxes its capital import constraints and as a consequence receives a
capital inflow from the ROW (which expands its capital stock by  10 per  cent.).  The model
assumes that current  account balances remain  at  the  prevailing level  in  the  base  period.
Accordingly, the need to finance interest payments from Mexico to the  ROW dictates that
Mexico should run a substantial surplus in its balance of trade -an  outcome which is basically
accommodated by the ROW.  In this scenario, third countries experience an improvement in
their terms-of-trade, a phenomenon related to the large expansion of Mexican exports.8
Table 1:  Summary of CGE Results on the Economic  Implications  of NAFTA for the Rest of the World (ROW)
(Percentage changes except where noted)
Brown, Deardorff
and Stern a/  Sobarzo b/  Cox and Harris ci
Case I  Case 2  Case I  Case 2  Case I  Case 2  Case 3
Exports from the ROW
To NAFTA countries  .0.06  -0.  0.3
To the US  *0.65  -0.64  *t0.9
To Canada  _  0.08  0.07  -2.4
Net Exports from the ROW d/
To NAFTA countries  0.35 ei  -10.88 ei
To Mexico  2.1  17.1
Termb of Trade for the ROW  -0.0  0.2
Welfare f/
ROW  .0.0  -0.0
Canada  0.7  0.7  0.003  0.936  -0.117
Mexico  1.6  5.0  2.3  2.4
US  0.1  0.3  1  1__
a/  The Brown, Deardorff and Stmrn  model  (29 sectors  of which 23 am tradable goods  sectors) assumes that technology  in most
tradeable sectors is characterized by increasing returns to scale and the market structure is monopolistically  competitive.
Cuse I (BDS' experiment  A) assumes complete removal  of tariffs among NAFrA members and a 25 percent increase  of
US import.  quotas which restrain Mexican  exports of agriculture. food, textiles  and clothing.  Case 2 (BDS' experiment  B)
maintains  the same assumptions  plus the liberalization  of Mexico's capital  import  controls, resulting in a 10 percent increase
in Mexico's capital stock.
b/  The Sobarzo model identifies  27 production  sectors and assumes imperfect competition  in most of its 21 tradeable  sectors.
The  model only addresses the impact of a complete removal of tariffs among NAFTA countries.  In case I  (Sobarzo's
version 2). a fixed quantity of capital in Mexico is assumed.  Case 2 (Sobarzo's version 3)  in tumr assumes that capital
is mobile between countries.
cl  The Cox and Harris model identifies 19 sectors with ten of them presenting increasing  returns to scale.  The trade results
reported  reflect absolute changes in the market sham of the ROW in total imports  of the United States and Canada.  The
base for comparison is provided  by the Canada-US  free trade area (CUSFTA)  situation. Case I compares  a hub-and-spoke
fornat  (with the United States as the hub and Canada and Mexico  as the spokes) with CUSFTA.  Case 2 compares the
NAFrA with CUSFTA.  Case 3 compares  a NAFrA combined with an  increase  of 10 percent of member countries' ad
valorem tariffs against the ROW with CUSFIA.  Preferential  trade liberalization in all cases reflects only tariff removal.
df  Net exports am defined as exports minus imports.
e/  Values in USS billions.
fI  Welfare changes  are measured in terms of the so-called  equivalent  variation  -i.c.,  they reflect the change in income  valued
at base prices that would lead to the same change in utility level associated with the liberalization.
Sources: Brown, Deardorff and Stem (1992). H. Sobarzo (1992) and Cox and Harris (1992).9
Sobarzo's "Case  2" scenario  assumes  a perfectly  elastic  supply  of foreign  capital.
The Mexican  economy  experiences  a much larger GDP increase  than in Case 1, which has a
fixed  capital  stock  assumption  (8.0 per cent  GDP increase  versus 1.9 per cent  in Case 1).7  This
higher level of growth, in turn, translates  into a significant  deterioration  in Mexico's trade
balance  with  the ROW, given  Sobarzo's  ad hoc export  supply  and import  demand  functions  used
to model Mexico's trade relations  with North America  and the ROW. 8
Case 3 in Cox and Harris illustrates  the negative  extemalities  of the NAFIA if
it becomes  an inward-oriented  bloc.  In this analysis,  the elimination  of tariffs  among  member
countries is combined  with a 10 per cent increase  in ad valorem tariffs applied by Canada,
Mexico, and the United  States  against  third country  imports. Table 1 shows  this would  reduce
trade volumes  between  NAFTA  and non-members  significantly  via direct  trade suppression.  An
explicit  movement  toward  an inward-oriented  trade  bloc in North  America  seems  unlikely. After
all,  as  illustrated by the Canadian welfare results, participating  countries would also be
negatively affected.  Still, these results highlight the dangers for  the ROW of  such a
development.
Perhaps, the main message  of these  analyses  concerns the importance  of capital
flows in detenrining the final outcome  of NAFTA  from the perspective  both of member and
third countries. Specifically,  CGE results  suggest  that barriers to capital  flows, as well as the
7  See Sobarm (1992).  Note that the welfare impact of both scenarios is approximately  the same (see Table
1); the explanation  being that despite the larger expansion  of the Mexican eco,nomy  in case 2, the additional income
generated by the use of foreign capital does not belong to Mcxican nationals.
'  Mexico's overall trade balance experiences a  18.3 per  cent deterioration,  refleting  an 18.9 per  cent
deterioration vis-a-vis the rest of North America (United  States and Canada)  and a 17.1 per cent deterioration vis-a-
vis the ROW.10
cost of international fmancing,  will play a much larger role in determining NAFTA's welfare
effects than its preferential trade liberalization  component.
C.  Alternative  Modeling  of NAFTA's Influence
The introduction  of imperfect competition  in CGE models has contradicted the
conventional  wisdom that wejfare  results associated  with trade liberalization  are insignificant  (a
usual outcome of CGE modeling  with constant  returns to scale). These models  cannot, however,
adequately account for the impact of trade liberalization  on growth rates.  The influence  of
liberalization  on capital  formhtion  and consumers' savings  decisions,  industry specialization,  and
capacity to import specializel inputs are some of the variables  emphasized  in attempts  to model
the dynamic implications of FTAs (See Young and Romero, 1991 or Kehoe, 1992).  As a
general rule,  these  "imperfect competition" models suggest that  the  dynamic benefits of
liberalization are much higher than the conventional  static benefits.  Accordingly, one could
argue that  they strengthen,the case for FTA arrangements to  the extent that the  "growth
dividend" more than offsets  distortions associated  with the preferential liberalization.
Detailed calculations  of the dynamic  effects  of NAFIA upon noinembers are not
(to our  knowledge) available.  The only  "dynamic" exercise that explicitly addresses the
evolution of trade between NAFTA and third countries is provided by Hufbauer and Schott
(1992). Their model introduces  dynamic  considerations  by imposing  an exogenously  determined
increase in the rate of Mexican  export growth. Linking the success of the NAFTA negotiations
to  further  liberalizing reforms  in  Mexico,  including "sweeping privatization, significant
liberalization  of the Mexicap oil sector, [and continuity  of3 fiscal and monetary restraints," theauthors assume that,  under these circumstances, Mexican exports of  goods and  non-factor
services will grow at an annual rate of  11.2 per  cent,  a figure which reflects the historical
experience of successful liberalization  by inward-oriented countries.  The failure of the NAFTA
negotiations, in tum,  is assumed to imply a smaller rate of growth for Mexican exports (7.9 per
cent), given the authors' assumption  that it would foster "policy retrogression" in Mexico.  This
lower rate of growth is based on historical data for "collapsed  liberalizations" and provides the
counterfactual scenario utilized by Hufbauer and Schott in estimating the econoniic impact of the
NAFTA.P
Their estimates of NAFTA's influence on trade among member countries are much larger
than those from conventional CGE models.  Hufbauer and Schott (1992, p.60) indicate their
"Mexico export gain is 50 percent larger than the most optimistic alternative model, while the
US export gain is more than twice as large."  The impact of NAFIA  on nonmember countries,
however, remains marginal (US net exports to third countries are unaffected by NAFIA,  while
Mexican net exports decline by US$ 3 billion).  Unfortunately, the assumptions utilized in their
calculations (Mexican export and import shares vis-a-vis the United States are fixed at 75 per
cent) limit the utility of their results for estimating trade diversion.
D.  Sectoral Analyses
Sectors with relatively high levels of protection in the United States are natrual
candidates for analyses concemed with trade and investment diversion from the perspective of
thX  non-NAFTA countries.  Statistics tabulated in this study (See Tables 2 and 4) indicate tiat
9  Histoncal data on  Iibemlizauion  experiments  is derived from Papageorgiou  er.al. (1991).12
agriculture (specific products), textiles, clothing, ferrous metals and automobiles are the key
sectors where such diversion may occur since they ihave  higher than average levels of protection.
(i)  Agriculture
Some CGE models focus un the implications of an FIA  between Mexico and the
United States for the agricultyral sector. Robinson etal.  (1991), for instance, analyze different
combinations of trade liberalization cum reform of agricultural policies in Mexico and in the
United  States  (including liberalization limited to  non-agricltural  activities).  Their  basic
conclusion is that, in the aggregate, an FTA expands bilateral trade under all scenarios.  Mexico
experiences some trade diversion as imports from third countries decline by 2 to 3 percentage
points  - the exception being the scenario with capital growth in  Mexico; in this case,  the
"growt  dividend" generate" a net increase in imports from the ROW.  With respect to the
United States, the FTA in almost all scenarios implies an increase in imports from non-FTA
members.  The results reflect the high level of protection given Mexican agriculture before the
liberalization.  Accordingly, they  recommend gradualism  in the  liberalization of  Mexican
agriculture in order to avoid "large mrual  outmigration from Mexico" (Robinson, et.aL,  1991,
p.3 3).
Once the focus of analysis becomes more product specific, however, one can
find cases of trade diversion from third countries in the US market.  Grennes ezxaL.  (1991), for
instance, use a partial cquiljbrium model to analyze the impact of preferential liberalization in
the Western  Hemisphere on  .agricu&ural  products.  They show that an FTA between the United
States and Mexico, by removing restrictions to Mexican exports of frozen-concentrated orange13
juice (FCOJ)  -which had an estimated  tariff equivalent  of 28 peq cent in 1988  --  would  divert
trade primarily  from Brazil. Despite  the significant  growth  of Mexican  exports  of FCOJ  to the
US market  (32 per cent), US imports  from third  countries  would  decline  by only 0.5 per cent.
The situation  changes,  however,  once one assumes  that in addition  to the tariff removal  the
NAFTA  (and Mexican  domestic  reforms)  stimulates  significant  new investments  in Mexican
citrus.  Assuming  a doubling  of the rate of growth of Mexican  FCOJ output, Spreen  er.aI.
(1992)  show--using  a long-term  model  of the world  citrus industry--that  by the year 2000 this
scenario  implies  a reduction  of 4.5 per cent  in Brazilian  production  of citrus (a decline  of 14.4
per cent in terms of on-tree  revenues)  vi-a-vis the baseline  and a much smaller  impact  on the
Florida  citrus sector  (a decrease  of 0.61 per cent  in terms of orange  production  and of 6.34 per
cent with respect  to on-tree  revenue).
Analyses  of agricultural  products  heavily  affected  by US quantitative  restrictions
provide  several  interesting  insights  concerning  the potential  inplications  of the NAFTA  for third
countries. Sugar  provides  the best  example  in this context. Borrell  and Coleman  (1991)  show
that bilateral  negotiations  concerning  trade in sugar anid  com syrup between  the United  States
and Mexico  may have significant  effects  for other countries. If, for instance,  under an FTA
Mexico  harmonizes  its pricing  policy with the one prevailing  in the United States  and both
countries  administer  a joint quota scheme  vs-a-vis  the ROW, this arrangement  would impose
significant welfare losses upon net exporters (the Caribbean, for instance, would experience a
net welfare loss of US$ 128 million; world welfare would fall by US$ 241 million).  An even
worse scenario can be imagined  if the negotiations  lead to an exchange of quota rights between
Mexican sugar producers (expanding their  access to  the  US market) and  US  corn  syrup14
producers (who would gain greater access to the Mexican market).  Under these conditions, US
corn  syrup would displace sugar in the Mexican market, which could end up in the United
States, fostering additional trade diversion (in this case world welfare would fall by US$ 256
million).
(ii)  Textiles and Apparel
Trela and Whalley (1992) analyze the implications of the elimination of MFA
quots  for the NAFTA countries (i.e., quotas imposed by the United States and Canada against
Mexico) and the influence of this action on the remaining MFA-restricted countries (which are
identified as the ROW).  They use a sector-specific CGE model with constant returns to scale,
encompassing four textile and apparel product categories and a composite product.  Goods are
treated as homogeneous across regions, trade in textiles  and apparel between exporting countries
(Mexico and the other 33 MFA-restricted countries) is assumed away, and MFA quotas are
presumed to be binding.  This latter assumption is at considerable odds with reality, however,
since Safadi and Yeats (1992) show that Mexico has consistently underutilized (by about 25
percent on average) its MFA quotas over the 1980s.
Trela and Whalley analyze several liberalization scenarios at bilateral (United
States-Mexico) and NAFTA levels in their model.  In general, their results indicate Mexico
"  It is important to keep in mind  that the Trela-Whalley  model, despite its sophistication, cannot capturc an
important faet  of the NAFTA negotiations  (those  dealing with rules of origin). Rules of origin for the textiles  and
apparel industry are usually deftned in tenns of changes in tariff nomenclature  headings in the productive process,
so that a final product using foreign inputs can quality for "domestic"  status (in practice, there is often the need to
complement this procedure with a value-added  test).  A simple transformation  rule requires a single tariff heading
change.  A double (triple) transformation  rule demands two (three) changes in tariff classifications. ln the context
of clothing, for  instance, a simple transformation rule requires that the product be cut and sewn in a member
country to qualify as local.  Double transformation  (as was the case for most textile and clothing products under
the Canadian-United  States FTA) requires that the inputs into the final product also pass the test--i.e.. that the fabric
be formed in the FTA member countries. Triple transfonnation. in tum, requires that all productive  processes from
yam forward be implemented  within the FTA_ The NAFTA adopted a triple transformation  rule.  Bannister and15
and the US would gain from the liberalization, while Canada and the ROW would lose.  Mexico
experiences a major outward-oriented  expansion with its exports to the United States increasing
significantly. The United States faces a minor adjustment (most of it in its apparel sector), but
lower consumer prices  produce positive welfare results.  Given the expansion of  Mexican
exports,  Canada  experiences  major market  share losses in the United States.  For the ROW,  the
negative welfare impact of the libevilization basically reflects the erosion of their US quota
rents.  The NAFTA (i.e.,  the removal of quotas and tariffs on textiles and apparel among
member countries) generates a welfare reduction of 0.03  per cent (in terms of GDP) for the
ROW.
(iii)  Steel Industry
The  US  steel  industry provides  another  example of  a  sector  which  enjoys
protection  mainly  in  the  form  of  quantitative restrictions-typically,  voluntary  restraint
agreements (VRAs).  Trela and Whalley (1992) also developed a  sector-specific CGE model to
analyze the effects of regional liberalization in North America-over a time horizon of 40 years-
focusing on the steel industry.  Their model identifies one importing region (the United States),
three exporting regions (Mexico, Canada, and a 19-country aggregate of other VRA-affected
exporting nations,  which represents the  ROW),  and  three  c9 ommodities/industries (a  steel-
producing industry; a steel-consuming  industry, which is an aggregate o. non-steel manufacturing,
industries, and an all-other-goods industry).
Low (1992) point out that the Mexican textiles and clotiing industry already displays a high level of dependence
on US inputs. Accordingly, compliance  with more strict  ules of origin should not impose major adjustment costs
for Mexico.  Strict rules of origin may, however, impair investment from non-NAFTA countries in the Mexican
industry, by tying its competitiveness  to the efficiency of the US textile sector.16
The results of steel trade liberalization at bilateral (United States-Mvexico)  and
trilateral level (NAFTA) mirror the results obtained in their analysis of the textiles and apparel
industry."  The main impact for the ROW is smaller quota rents, reflecting terms of trade
effects.  However,  their analysis suggests that another  important secondary effect of  the
preferential liberalization may occur.  As a  consequence of  lower steel prices,  US  steel-
consuming industries experience an increase in their competitiveness vis-a-vis the ROW.
(iv)  The Automobile Indlstry
Trade in automobiles  and auto parts constitutes the most important component of
North  American intra-trade.  Most  of  this  trade  is conducted either  duty-free  or  under
preferential (low) tariffs.  Accordingly, one should not a priori expect a major impact from the
NAFTA on the ROW as far as these trade flows are concemed.
The it.  st detailed  auto industry model available  is provided by Hlunter,  Markusen,
and Rutherford (HMR) (1992). This study analyzes  the production  of finished autos using a four
region CGE model (Canada, Mexico, United  States, and the ROW) having two goods (autos and
a composite of the remaining goods and services), and two factors of production, and assumes
increasing returns to scale in the  auto industry (with frins  following Coumot behavior) and
"  As in the case of textiles and apparel, even the most sophisticated models cannot incorporate all aspects
of North American steel trade.  The Trela-Whalley  model, for instance, assumes that the direction of trade before
and aiter the liberalization  is from Mcxico  to the United States. Accordingly,  trade liberalization  would bring about
a contracion of the US steel sector.  This forecast seems to be at odds with the "qualified" support offered by the
American Iron and Steel Istitute  to the NAFTA talks.  The explanation, however, is quite simplc-  The United
States is a net steel exporter to Mexico.  Hence, the preferential  liberalizaion of Mexican  steel tariffs, as well as
of governmcat procurement policies based on a buy-Mexican  provision, is probably attractive enough for the US
steel industry for it to accept the preferential  quot  and tariff removal on the US side  This, in turn, suggests that
steel exporters from the ROW will also experience  trade diversion in the Mexican  market as a rcsult of the NAFTA.17
homogeneous products across countries.  Two interesting aspects of the HMR analysis are its
explicit attempt to model the behavior of transnational corporations (TNCs) and the endogeneity
in the number of auto plants.
Different liberalization scenarios (which basically involve the removal of tariffs)
at  bilateral  and  trilateral  (NAFTA)  level are  evaluated.  Two  scenarios  are  particularly
interesting:  free trade at the trilateral level (Mexico-Canada-United  States) for producers only
(a situation which allows producers to price-discriminate  across borders) and market integration
(which allows free trade at the consumer level between the United States and Mexico, while free
trade across the United States-Canada  border remains limited to producers).
As far as welfare results are concerned, Mexico is the clear "winner" in these
situations.  The impact upon Canada, the United States, and the ROW are not significant in
relative terms,  although some trade  diversion would  result.  In  the  producers'  free-trade
scenario, Mexican exports increase by 77,000 cars, while Canada and the ROW experience a
decline in  their exports of  9,000 and 32,000 cars, respectively.  In  the  market integration
scenario, Mexican exports increase by 157,000 cars, while Canadian exports fall by 37,000 cars
and  car exports  from the ROW fall by 2,000  units  vis-a-vis  the benchmark  situation.
The differences in trade diversikn results from these two scenarios are explained
by  the  assumptions made with  respect to  the  pricing  behavior of  TNCs.  Under  market
integration, TNCs in Mexico makes a significant reduction in their markups while the plants
located in the United States would be expected to raise their markups in an attempt to prevent
arbitrage between the two markets.  This may allow the ROW to  increase its exports to the
United States by 10,000 units vis-a-vis the benchmark, thereby minmiing  the trade diversion18
effects of the NAFTA.
The integration scenario suggests, however, that the ROW may be affected in a
different  way.  Although  in  both  scenarios  liberalization does  not  lead  to  significant
rationalization effects in the  United States and Canada, it does have a  dramatic impact in
Mexico, increasing the output per firm by 19.7 per cent in the producers' free-trade case and
by 155 per cent in the markoi integration scenario." 1 In the integration scenario rationalization
forces two of the five existipg auto producers in Mexico to close their plants.' 3 The model
does not identify  what type of firm would  be forced out under these circumstances (there are two
types of firms in the HMR model: North Am6rican  firms and ROW firms), but it calls attention
to the possibility that firms in Mexico may be directly affected in this process.
It can be argued that those fins  that have already established a North American
core network strategy (in terps  of suppliers and markets) will be in a better position to expand
their activities in the context of the NAFTA.  This argument is even more relevant given the
strict local content requirements adopted  by the NAFTA. In the case of automobiles, after a ten-
year transition per. -d,  they wvill  be sold free of duty across national frontiers within NAFTA
2  The US and Canadian  results are explained  in  terms of the domination  of the industry  by TNCs.  According
to the authors, imports from Mexico  are not interpreted  as a loss of market by the US  TNCs, given the pattern of
plant ownership in the industry (p  -e Hunter, Markusen, and Rutherford 1992, p.80).
13  The five Mexican  auto producers have followed  differcnt market orientation  strategies  until recently. The
three US auto makers (Chrysler, .eneral  Motors, and Ford) are outward oriented, exporting mainly to the North
American market. Taking inEo  account vehicles. engines, and auto parts, exports accounted  respectively for 48.4
per cent, 68.4 per cent, and 81.5 ner cent of the total sales by GM. Ford, and Chrysler Mexican  operations  in 1987.
The totality of these exports in the case of Chrysler and Ford went to North America (60 per cent in the case of
GM).  Exports from VW and Nissan, in tum, were esti-mted to represent at most 35 percent of their sales, with
a more diversified trade orientafon (for instance, only 20 per cent of the Mexican VW exports went to North
America). See UNCTC (1991).19
only if at least 62.5 percent of their inputs are also made in North America.' 4 The role of
rules of origin in free-trade areas is reviewed in Box 1.
BOX  1: RULES  OF ORIGIN
Rules  of origin  are the instrument  used  to determine  which  goods  and services  in a free trade area
(FTA)  or in a customs  union  arc entitled  to preferential  treatment.  RiAs  use different  methods  to deternine
origi.  Substantial  transformation,  change  in tariff heading,  minimum  value added, and specified-process
systems  are the main  methods  used. In customs  unions,  given  the existence  of a common  external  barrier,
rules of origin  are equivalent  to domestrc  content  requirements,  and arc  also  used  to determine  quota  eligibility
when  quantitative  rcstrictions  apply.  In FTAs,  however,  the main role of rules of origin is to impede  trade
deflection  schemes,  by which outsiders  would  use the partner in the FTA with the lowest  trade barriers  to
trans-ship  thcir products  to the more  protected  markets  in the PTA.
Rules of origin  can, however,  be used for export  pmtection.  In prace,  this means  that one FTA
partner  can effectively  impose  its higher  external  barrier  on another  partner,  which  has lower  restrictions  on
an input used to produce a good qualifying for duty-free treatment within the FTA. If transport  costs are not
significant.  a firm in country  A will  be led to buy higher-cost  inputs  from  country  B in the FTA,  rather  than
from  outsiders  - if the effective  rate of protection  for the final  good is higher  in country  B and the purchase
is necessary  to characterize  origin (Kruger,  1993).  For example,  a producer  of finished  garment  in A may
find it profitable  to buy fabric  woven from B's yarn rather than from cheaper  imported  yarn, in order to
qualify  for free access  to B's mariet.
In sensitive  sectors such as textiles  and clothing,  and autos, 'frec-Wtrade  within NAFTA  came
-together  with strict  rules of origin.  A cotton  shirt-maker  in Mexico,  for example,  can only sell the shirt free
of -duty  in the United  States  if it is made  from cotton  fabric-woven  in the NAFTA  region  - which, in turn,
comes  from yarn-and  thread  spun  in the region.  This "triple-transformation  test" is more  restrictive  than the
one established  in the CUSFTA  (where  a double-aasfoDmation  test applied)  and entails a higher level of
implicit  discriination against  outsiders.
Automobiles,  after a ten-year  transition  period,  will be sold free of duty across  national  frontiers
within  N.FTA onIy if they have at least 62.5 percent  of North American  contentS.  Meanwhile,  Mexico's
restrictive  import regime  will be phased  out vis-a-vis  its NAFTA  partners.  The  new rules of origin  seem  to
impose stricter conditions than those prevailing  under the CUSFTA (although one should keep in mind  that
the change  in the number  of countries  involved  in the RIA  qualifies  this comparison).  The-required  regional
content  is higher  (62.5  percent  versus  50 percent)  and  the calculation  procedures  have  been-  changed  to ensure
that certain-  critical inputs in the manufactring  process  are made  in North  America  in order-  for the final
product  to qualify  for duty  free.  tratMntL
There are no reliable  estimates  of the distortions  introduced  by restrictive  rules of origin.-  It seems
unlikely  that  these  distortions  will  significantly  increase  the magnitude  of the  trade  diversion  effects  associated
with NAFTA. Yet, rules of origin may play a role in fostering  investment  diversion.-  another  source of
concem  for outsiders  with respect  to trading-blocs.
14  The 62.5 percent rule  will also apply  to light  trucks, engines  and tranissions,  while a 60 percent  rule
will be used for other vehicles  and parts.  The  new rules of origin will be binding  after an eight-year  transition
period  for automakers  already  established  in the  region. New  investments,  however,  will  have to comply  with the
stricter  rule after a five-year  grace  period,  during  which  a 50 per cent rule will  apply.20
Summing up,  quantitative sectoral stLdies tcnd to confrm  the thesis that the
NAFTA may not have a major impact on non-member countries as far as trade  flows are
concerned (although some specific industries of non-member countries may be significantly
affected).  Investment  diversipn is another source of concern for the ROW-particularly for East
Asian NEEs  and Japan.  Up to now, however, there is only limited anecdotal evidence on this
issue. For example, Zenith 4lectronics Corporation, a US company, has announced its decision
to transfer a manufacturing  plant from Taiwan to Mexico.  This resolution has been interpreted
as evidence of the role played by expectations about the NAFrA  in the allocation of resources
of. TNCs  (see  UNCTC  1992, p.  78).  The impact of  NAFTA's  (explicit or  implicit)
dfiscriminton  against investmnents  from non-member countries remains an open question.
m.  NAFTA and East Asian Emorts: The Potential for Trade Diversion
As  indicated in  the  sectoral sudies  just  reviewed,  there  are  two  important
preconditions for NAFrA  to have major trade-diverting effects: (1) there must be competition
between NAFTA member 4nd nonmember countries; and (2) North American trade barriers
must be  important.  The latter is  required for NAPTA to  extend meaningful competitive
advantage to member countries (i.e.,  these barriers will be relaxed against North American
suppliers' exports but will continue to face third countries).  Thus, a first assessment of the
potential impact of NAFTA on East Asia can follow from an analysis of the level and structure
of trade barriers that Asian exporters now encounter in North America.21
A.  The Potential  for Tariffs  to Divert  Trade
Table 2 provides  rtlevant information  using summary  statistics  on the US tariffs
that 12 East Asian economies  currently face. The rates reported here are post-Tokyo  Round
"applied" rates that reflect the weighted average of  the MFk  or  Generalized  System of
Preference  (GSP)  rates actually  applied  to each tariff line level  product. Aside from totals, the
tariff rates  have  also been  computed  for broad  one- and two-digit  SITC  categories  (see  Appendix
r, Table A2 for 1990  East Asian  exports of each group). The United States  was chosen  as the
focus for this analysis given its overwhelming  importance  widtin  NAFTA. 5
'5  In 1990 for example, 93 percet  of East Asia's exports to North America went to the United Smtes, 6
percent went to Canada, and only I percent went to Mexico.22
Tahle  2: Averqge  Discriminalory  US  Tariff  Margins  East  Asian  Exponers  Cuuld  Face  Due  to NAFrA
Applied  US  Tariffs  on  East  Asian  Exponer  (%)
Product  French  Rep.  of  Taiwan.
(SITC)  China  Fiji  Polynesia  Hong  Kong  Indonesia  Karca  liicau  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  China  iluiland
All tnonds  (0-9)  327  5.3  0.1  9.8  5.1  7.5  12.7  2.6  6.2  3.6  7.3  3.9
Food  & Live  Animals  (0)  2.7  0.0  0.9  4.6  1.4  2.4  0.1  1.3  1.7  0.7  4.3  4.3
Beverages&  Tobacco(l)  4.0  - --  3.4  1.8  6.1  - 0.0  2.1  2.5  2.6  9.9
Cwude  Materials  (2)  2.9  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.0  2.7  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.4  2.7  0.0
Energy Products  (3)  0.6  - 1.4  0.5  1.0  0.5  0.0  0.1  3.4  0.6
Animal  & Vegeltible  Oils  (4)  2.2  9.3  0.0  2.4  0.0  0.0  3.7  1.1  0.3
All Manufactured  Good%  (5-8)  9.5  10.7  0.l  9.9  13.1  7.5  12.9  3.0  7.5  3.7  7.4  4.0
Chenicals  (S)  5.2  3.5  0.0  5.6  1.1  6.2  0.0  0.0  0.8  4.3  5.7  0.5
LeaLchrGOods(61)  5.7  - 4.4  0.8  4.3  0.1  0.0  0.1  1.7  4.2  0.1
Rubber  Manufacturcs  (62)  4.8  5.5  1.9  4.2  0.0  0.2  1.5  4.2  5.5  1.1
Wood  Mlanuractures  (63)  5.9  0.0  5.S  7.2  5.6  1.)  2.1  0.7  4.6  5.4  0.0
Yam& Fabrics  (65)  8.7  0.0  *-  2.7  12.2  13.7  8.5  12.3  7.2  118.  10.3  9.7
Iron  & Steel  (67)  3.9  --  3.8  1.7  4.1  3.8  1.7  2.4  4.5  2.6
NunrICrruu  NIta1is  (68)  0.1H  - 2.5  0.(1  2.(  0.0  0.0  1.5  3.0  O0
Transport  & Machinery  (71  4.9  0.0  11.1  3.4  0.4  2.7  11.8  t).  1162  1.9  3.8  03
Nonclcciric  Mlachinery  (71)  3.9  - 011  2.2  0.4  2.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.1  2.9  0.1
Electric  Ntlahincry  (72)  5.0  0.0  4.2  0.4  2.7  0.0  0.6  0 2  3.2  4.2  0.1
Transpon  Equipment  (73)  4.7  0.0  2.6  0.1  2.6  3.8  0.0  0.1  0.7  6.0  5.3
Travel Goods  (83)  15.4  --  --  13.3  13.5  14.6  3.1  7.0  13.9  12.0  1230  11.9
Clotliing  (84)  14.6  15.7  9.6  17.3  22.6  17.1  20.6  16.4  18.0  24.4  22.9  19.8
Fonlwear  (85)  14.8  --  *-  12.4  8.1  11.1  9.3  22.2  12.1  - 7.5  1.3  10.9
Nhiscellatwus  hNlanitituccres  (89)  6.18  111  11.41  4.7  0.1  5.1  0.1  1.1  10.3  2.2  5.2  111
Note:  Two dashes  (--) indicate  no trde  in Lhe  product  group.
Sou  rc:,:  Computed  using  ihe  World  Banik-UNCTAD  SMIART  data  base.  The  lwriffs  shiown  are  the  trade  wcighicd  averages  uf slic  MIFN  or GSP  rates  actually  applied  lo each  coumuhry's  exports.23
Overall, US tariffs would provide adverse duty margins that range from a low of
one-tenth of one percent in the case of French Polynesia's exports to a higl  of 12.7 percent in
the case of Macau.  The difference is due to Macau's trade be;hg concentrated in high tariff
items like clothing while many of French Polynesia's exports consist of (duty frce) items like
pearls and precious stones and some agricultural products.  Of the 11 East Asian economics
listed in Table 2, four (French Polynesia, Malaysia, Singapore  and Thailand)  could face adverse
NAFTA tariff margins of under 5 percent while Indonesia  and Fii  have tariff differentials  only
slightly higher in the 5.1 to 5.3 percent range.  The primary reason for these relatively low rates
is that the proportion of textiles and clothing (high US duty products) in their total exports is
relatively low--see Appendix I, Table A2.2'  As indicated  in Table 2, the economies that would
be most severely affected by NAFTA are China, Hong Kong, and Macau where import duties
average between 9 and 13 percent.  Textiles, clothing, footwear, and travel goods stand out as
high-tariff sectors where important (NAFTA-induced)  trade diversion may occur.
Table 3  allows examination of  the differential tariffs  individual East Asian
economies could encounter due to NAFTA from a different perspective.  The table shows (the
two rightmost columns) total US imports from each of the 11 East Asian economies and the
number of tariff line products each exports (the US custom sch4dule distinguishes  8,753 tariff
line items).
16  Over three-quarters  of Singapore's  and 57 percent of Malaysia's  exports consist of transport and machinery
products (SIrC 7) that face US tariffs in the one to four percent range.  In contrast, 57 percent of Macau's US
exports consist  of clothing (SITC 84) as opposed to 7 to 12 percent for Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan (China), and
Malaysia. Some of the East Asian  countries, like Indonesia,  Malaysia, Philippines  and Thailand,  also benefit from
US GSP preferences  which lower the adverse differential  tariffs they would encounter under NAFTA.24
Table 3:  Proriles  of East  Asian  Exports  Affected  by High, Moderate,  and  Low  US  Tariffs
Products  with tariffs over  IS percent  Products  with tariffs  ovcr 10  percent  Products  with tariffs  over  5 prcment  All 1989  Exports
No. of  Value  % of total  No. of  Value  % of total  No. or  Value  % of iotal  No. of  Value
EAST  ASIA
tChina,  People's  Republic  446  2,062  16.1  776  3,274  25.6  2,062  8,270  68.2  3,924  12,793
Fiji  19  4  19.9  21  4  20.9  26  6  32.1  93  19
French  Polynesia  I  --  0.1  2  0.2  6  - 1.4  34  9
Hong  Kong  416  2,937  28.9  713  3,369  33.1  1,954  6,738  66.2  3,634  10,172
Indonesia  190  580  15.0  270  679  17.5  434  1,149  29.7  1,096  3,867
Korea,  Republic  471  2,654  12.9  806  4,115  20.0  2,127  9,958  48.4  3,955  20,556
Macau  131  340  49.0  171  368  53.0  259  431  62.1  540  694
Malaysia  176  394  8.0  245  483  9.8  391  763  15.5  1,299  4,906
Philippines  241  758  23.0  370  913  27.7  589  1,195  36.3  1,713  3,290
Singapore  167  604  6.6  261  693  7.6  857  1,933  21.1  1,859  9.151
Taiwan,  China  513  3,007  11.8  888  4,591  18.0  2,417  13,069  51.2  4,652  25,511
Thailand  253  407  8.8  385  770  16.7  672  1,255  27.2  2,101  4,611
NAFTA  MEMBERS
Canada  471  261  0.3  785  820  2.5  2,136  3,056  3.4  6.537  38,819
Mexico  334  916  3.3  554  1,190o  5.4  993  3,562  13.0  4,186  27,369
Note:  The  above  tabulations  indicate  the  number  of items  and  value  of trade  that  cncounters  a certain  minimum  tariff level  (say  5 percent).  By subiracting  the  corresponding  statistics  for the  nexL
highest  tariff 'cut-ofr  from these  totals  one  can  determine  the  trade  that  occurs  within the  tariff range.  For example,  42.6  percent  (68.2-25.6)  of China's  exports  (1.286  tariff lines)  face
tariffs  of between  5 and  10  percent.
Source:  Computed  using  the  World  Bank  - UNCTAD  SMART  data  base.25
The three columns (moving leftward) show the tariff lines, import values, and
share of total exports that are free of duty or face a "nuisance" tariff of 5 percent or less.'
In order to  distinguish "moderate" and "high" tariffs, similar information is shown (moving
leftward) for two additional groups of items.  The first for US tariffs of at least 10 percent,
while the second uses a 15 percent tariff cut-off.
The main message of Table 3 is that a  high degree of variation exists in the
vulnerability of individual  East Asian economies  to differential (adverse) NAFTA tariffs.  Only
16 percent of Malaysia's exports encounter US tariffs of 5 percent or more (391 product lines
are involved) and less than 10 percent are "high tariff products" (duties of 15 percent or more).
Much the same result applies to Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan (China) where high tariff
products only comprise about 10 percent of total exports.  In contrast, economies with a
relatively high share of textiles, clothing, or footwear in total exports (See Appendix I Table A2
for statistics identifying these traders) are far more  ?at  risk" to NAFTA given that between one-
quarter to one-half of total exports face US tariffs of 15 percent or more (Hong Kong, Macau
and the Philippines fall in this latter group).
Although the point is not specifically addressed in Table 3,  ihere is reason to
believe that  these tabulations may overstate the potential for trade conflicts between East Asia
and NAFTA members because the latter's products do not appear to pose viable competition  for
some of the former's products (see Safadi and Yeats, 1992). In other words, Table 3 shows  that
"7  In the Uruguay  Round several  delegations  suggested  that tariffs of under 5 perceat had  no (or insignificant)
trade effects  and these duties should  be abolished  without  negottion.  The  Canadian  delegation  to the Tokyo  Round
negotiations  incorporated this propol  in a general formulae designed to lower MFN tariffs.  For a discussion  see
Laird and Yeats (1987).26
NAFTA will provide Mexico and Canada with preferential tariffs of 15 percent or more for
approximately one-quarter of the exports of Hong Kong and the Philippine, yet no (or little)
trade displacement  will occur unless the NAFTA members are able to capitalize on these tariff
differentials.  In several sectors, particularly  chemicals and clothing, this competition appears
doubtful since supply constraints seemingly are  operating, or Mexico and Canada have not
established an export base that would allow them to compete with the East Asian producers."
B.  The Potential for NTBs to Divert Trade
In  identifying sectors where  NAFTA  may  displace East  Asian  exporters,
consideration  should also be given to the effects of nontariff barriers as well as tariffs.  Since
many US NTBs have estimated nominal  equivalents in the range of 25 to 75 percent (see Laird
and Yeats, 1990) the removal of these restrictions on NAFTA intra-trade. and their continued
inposition on imports from East Asia, could have major trade diverting effects.  Thus, a key
question is which East Asian products are prmarily affected by US nontariff barriers?
Table 4 lists the shares of US imports from individual  East Asian economies that
are subject to one or more forms of "hardcore" nontariff barriers."  In addition to totals for
8  For examnple,  of the 446 tariff line level products that China exports under tariffs of 15 percent or more
(see Table 3) Canada and Mexico have been able to establish a minimal export base (defined as at least $100
thousand  in exports to the IjniteC  States)  for about one-half  of these items.  Safadi  and Yeats (1992) also show that
in clothing Canada is not a factor and Mexico  operates under important  supply constraints--  this is a sector that is
of major importance  to several East Asian countries. During the last half of the 1980s, Mexico  left approximately
one-quarter of its US MFA quotas unfilled and thus would appear not to be in a position to fully capitalize on
NAFTA preferences.
19  The measures included in computing these trade coverage ratios are: tariff quotas, anti-dumping and
countervailing  duties.  flexible import fees like variable levies, all quotas and prohibitions, 'voluntary" export
restraints, MFA quotas and consultations,  and textile quotas and consultations. The measures are often referred
to as 'hard core'  NTBs becasq  their intent  is to restrict imports. The tabulations  in Table 4 do not include other27
categories of all goods and all manufactures,  the NTB coverage ratios have been computed at
lower levels of aggregations  in order to identify  specific  product sectors that are vulnerable to
(nontariff barrier-induced)  trade diversion.
As indicated In Table 4, there is considerable  variation in NTB coverage indices
for individual  East Asian economies. For example, 61 percent of Macau's exports are subject
to these measures, while none of French Polynesia's exports faces nontariff barriers.  A key
underlying factor accounting  for these variations  is the degree  to which  exports are concentrated
in textiles (SITC  65) and clothing  (SITC 84)-the higher the concentration  the greater the overall
NTB coverage ratio.'  The implications  of Table 4 are; however, that East Asian exporters
need to be concerned  with an NTB-induced  trade diversion  under NAFTA in a relatively few
sectors like textiles, clothing, travel goods, ferrous metals, and some specific  food products. 2
measures like health and sanitary restrictions  since these may be primarily directed at some 'non-trade policy"
objective.
20  US steel imporns  are subject  to VRAs  that have been  negotiated  on a bilateral  basis.  These products  are
often  subject  to antidumping  duties. Such restrictions  account  for the relatively  high NTB coverage  ratios of several
East Asian countries and in particular  of the Republic  of Korea (94 percent) in SITC 67.  Several estimates  (see
Laird and Yeats, 1990, p. 208) indicate  that these  measures  have NTB  ad  valorem  equivalents  in the range of 25
to 50 percent.
21  For example,  the 20 percent coverage  ratio on the Philippines'  food exports (SITC  0) is due to US flexible
import fees on sugar.  These measures, which operate in tle  same manner as EC variable import levies, have
nominal  equivalents  that often  exceed  100  percent. The relatively  high  NTB coverage  ratios for travel goods  (SITC
83)  are due to various  forms  of restrictions  with MFA  quotas  being among  the most prevalent  (specal texdle quotas
outside  the MFA are also fairly  widely  applied). Antidumping  and countervailing  duties  are also imposed  frequently
in SITC 83 and 89 and there are some VARs-a few of which are direted  specifically  against the Republic of
Korea.28
Table 4:  US Hard Care NTB  Coverage  Ratios for Imports  from East Asian Economies
French  Hong  Rep. of  Taiwan,
Product  (SITC)  China  Fiji  Polynesia  Kong  Indonesia  Korea  Macau  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  China  Thailand
AlrGoadr(0  oY)  29.6 - 48.0  0.0  41.r-3  -484  - 26.5  -6..0--  -10.1  . 29.5  9.8  t6.8  19.3
Food & Live Animals  (0)  0.5  51.3  0.0  10.8  6.4  3.8  0.0  4.8  28.8  3.4  15.4  37.7
Beverages  & tobacco  (1)  0.0  - - 0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Crude Materials  (2)  15.5  0.0  0.0  5.4  0.0  0.3  30.9  0.1  0.0  1.5  6.4  0.1
Energy  Producis (3)  0.0  - 0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Anirnal & Vegetable  Oils (4)  0.0  - 0.0  0.0  0.0  n.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
All Manufactured  Goods (5 to 8)  32.9  46.9  0.0  42.1  49.3  26.8  61.5  11.3  32.1  10.1  16.8  16.1
Chemicals  (5)  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0
Leather goods (61)  0.3  - 1.4  0.0  3.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.9  0.1
Rubber Manufactures  (62)  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  62.2  0.1  0.8
Wood Manufactures  (63)  0.0  0.0  --  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Yam & Fabrics (65)  90.9  0.0  - 92.6  97.0  63.1  92.2  98.9  72.6  91.5  92.5  43.2
[ron&  Steel (67)  20.2  - 1.2  5.2  93.8  27.2  0.1  28.5  39.6  S2.6
Nonrerrous  Metals (68)  0.0  - 0.0  0.0  0.2  --  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Transport & Machinery  (7)  0.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  11.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.0  6.5  0.5
Nonelectric  Machinery  (71)  6.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.2  1.9  1.0
Electric Machinery  (72)  0.0  --  0.0  0.0  0.0  20.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.4  11.6  0.0
Transport Equipment  (73)  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.2  0.0  3.5
Travel Goods  (83)  32.0  - - 23.7  40.6  31.4  6.9  34.0  72.6  17.9  64.9  74.7
Clothing  (84)  93.2  68.7  0.0  94.9  98.3  70.9  99.6  77.2  80.6  9L.9  92.0  88.4
Footwear  (85)  0.0  - 00  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Misc. Manufactures  (89)  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.0  23.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
I1  Hard Core NTBs include; tariff  quotas; anti-dumping  and countervailing  duties; flexible import fees (variable  levies); all quotas and prohibitions;  voluntary  export restraint; MFA quotas
and consultations;  and textile quotas and consultations.
Source:  Computed  using the World Bank  - UNCTAD  SMART  data base.29
IV.  Simulations of NAFTA's Effects on East Asia
Analysis in the previous section focused on the identification of specific sectors
where East Asian exports were especially "at risk" to a NAFTA-induced  trade diversion, but did
not provide any indication as to the magnitude of the displacenient that might occur.  In this
section we attempt to provide such infomation through the use of alternative trade simulation
models; the first is based on a partia' equilibrium  approach, while the second utilizes a gravity
flow model that, along with other features, incorporates the expetience of countries like the EC
or EFTA that previously had formed preferential trading arrangements.  This latter (gravity
flow) approach is particularly useful for assessing  the longer-term  implications  of NAFTA when
such important varables  as investment flows, exchange rates, or the terms of trade have fully
adjusted to the agreement.  In contast,  the partal  equilibrium model is better able to capture
the short to medium term effects (say three to five years) and has the advantage of providing
esfimates at very low levels of product detail.  See Appendix H for a description of both trade
projection models.
A.  Partial Euuilibrium Estimates of NAFrA's  Effects
Table 5 summarizes  the "NAFTA  effect" sinulatons  for East Asia as a group and
also presents individual country results.  The table shows the i990 value of US imports from
each East Asian economy and then indicates the value of tiade that could be displaced by
NAFTA.  Although the underlying trade diversion projections are made at the tariff line level,
they have been aggregated in Table 5 to six broad product categories like foods and feeds, total
manufactres,  and clothing.30
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In aggregate, Table 5 suggests that NAFTA should have only a relatively minor
influence on East Asian exporters--a  finding that closely confonns to other investigatiqns  which
focussed on different regions (see Section II).  For the East Asia region as a whole, trade losses
of about $384 million are projected with China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (China) accounting for
almost 70  percenL  of the total.'  Ihe  projected losses represent less than one-half of one
percent of total 1990 East Asian exp  orts to the United States although this ratio rises to about
three-quarters of one percent in the case of some individual economies like Macau and Hong
Kong?23
Sectoral analysis of the projected losses indicates fhat approximately one half of
the East Asian trade diversion occurs-  in the textiles and clothing  sector (SITC 65 and 84), with
clothing alone accounting for roughly 40 percent ($151 million) of the total.  Aside from the
manufactring  sector, only about $6 million in East Asian trade losses are projected with about
half this total occurring in the crude materials (SITC 2)  sector -particularly  in component
products like vegetable fibers, and synthetic and regenerated fiblers.
Although the East Asian trade losses look modest, there are several reasons to
2  There are two main reasons  why the projected  trade losses are relatively  small. First, Canada is simply  not
a viable competitor for many of the labor intensive  manufacures that East Asian  countries specialize in with  the
result that Canada's capacity for trade diversion is limited.  As an example, in 1991 US imports of clothing and
footwear from Canada were only  $306 million  and $31 million,  respectively,  thile  those from East Asia were $18.4
and $6.7 billion.  Scownd,  Mexico still plays a relatively  small role in US trade-i  1991  only about 6 percent of
all US imports  came from Mexico--and  does not have either the size or the capacity to divert a large share of non-
NAFTA countries' trade in the short-mn.
D  The  relatively high  losses for  Macau and  Hong Kong are,  as previously noted, expected due  to
concentration  by exporters in textiles  and clothing (see Appendix I, Table A2).  The results for Taiwan (China)  are
somewhat different in that trade losses of about $15 million are projected for miscellaneous  manufactures (SITC
89), a total for this group that is more than five times higher than that for any other East Asian exporter.  The
underlying  tariff line level data shows that Taiwan's losses  are concentrated  in about four product lines like stuffed
toys and dolls, Christmas  decorations,  and children's toys where it has a rela4vely  high market share and US tariffs
avcrage over 10 percent.32
believe that they might be overstated.  First,  the estimates are  based on the assumption of
infinitely elastic supply conditions in Mexico and Canada, i.e.,  these countries are assumed to
be able to increase exports with no corresponding  rise in unit costs.  If these costs do in fact
rise,  then the value  of East Asian  trade that would be diverted  could become  lower.?  Some
evidence suggests that supply constraints  may be of particular importance  in the clothing  sector.
During the most part of the 1980s. Mexico has systematically  left unfilled approximately one-
quarter of its US MFA quotas (see Safadi and Yeats, 1992).  Second, certain provisions in
NAFTA's  "rules of origin'  may prevent North American exporters from using low cost non-
NAFTA raw material sources with the resul  that intra-North American trade may not be able
to fully capitalize on some  preferences. Third, the projections  assume  that all NTBs (and tariffs)
on North American trade are removed, yet experience  with the Canada-United  States FTA shows
that barriers are likely be retamied  in some "sensitive' sectors (like restrictions on wood shingle
imports by the United States).  Finally, the simulation  results reported in Table 5 are based on
the margins of preference that existing tariffs and NTBs could provide NAFTA members.  A
successful completion of  the  Uruguay Round would lower these  trade  barriers  (and  the
preference margins that could be granted to NAFTA members)  which would also lower the total
value of East Asia's exports that would be diverted.'
24  In order wO  test the sensitivity of our projections to assumptions concerning supply condition in Mexico and
Canada's  we substituted  several different  supply elasticities  in our  simulation model.  When a supply elasticity  of
unity was assumed for all products  (a situation in which unit production costs increase by the same proportion that
exports  expand)  the  East Asian  trade losses total about $280 million as opposed  to $375 million under  infinitely
elastic supply assumptions.  If an intermediate  elasticity is assumed  (one having  a value of  three)  the East Asian
losses are approximately  $335 million.
I  Our projections,  as well as the summary statistics on trade barriers reported in Tables 2 and 4 inditae  that
a global liberalization of textile and clothing trade would greatly reduce the potential for East Asian trade diversion
due to NAFTA,  so related  developments in the Uruguay Round are of particular  importance.  The Uruguay Round
agreement,  for example,  establishes a four-ztage phase-out of the quotas that exist under the MultifiberArrngement33
B.  Gravitv Flow Analysis  of NAFTA's Effects
The possibility exists that the (partial equilibrium)  trade simulations  analyzed in
the previous section may not adequately incorporate the longer term trade changes that may
result from NAFTA.  This would be true if NAFTA were to induce important changes in
international  or domestic investment  patterns, if it were to create new opportunities  for some
industries  to achieve  substantial  economies  of scale, or if the arrangement  were to change  other
key variables like exchange  rates or the terns of trade -- all of which are factors that cannot be
incorporated in  a partial equilibrium analysis.  To assess the potential importance of these
effects, we employ a modified version of a gravity flow model.6 The model, which was
developed using data drawn from 95  industrial and developing countries, incorporates the
experience of other nations when customs  unions or free trade arrangements  like the EC or
EFT1A  were formed.  In addition, it also allows one to incorporate  the influence  of factors like
distance, level of economic  development,  height of trade barriers when each arrangement  was
formed, or the sharing of a common  language  or border.  Appendix  II provides a fuU  technical
description of the model and its specification  along with the empirical estimates.  Table 6
summarizes  the model's projections  for the NAFTA-induced  increase in non-oil exports from
Canada and Mexico to the United States as well as the value of trade of East Asia and other
country groups that could be displaced.
(MFA) over a 10 years period.
26  For a technical  discussion  of gravity-type  models  and their use in trade  simulation  exercises,  see Anderson
(1979).34
Table 6: A Gravity  Flow Model Projections  of the Influence  of NAFrA on US Non-Oil Imports
Predicted  Imlorts Under NAFTA
1989 Actual  U.S.  Value  Percentage
Exporter  Imports (S Mill.)  (S Mill.)  Change(%)
NAFTA Members  103,623  113,696  9.7
Canada  80.632  88,130  9.3
Mexico  22,991  25,566  11.2
East Asia and Pacific 1/  80.400  79,722  -0.8
Hong Kong  10.237  10.062  -1.7
Indonesia  2,431  2.414  -0.7
Rep. of Korea  20.557  20,416  -0.7
Malaysia  4.688  4.649  -0.8
Taiwan, China  25.626  25,433  -0.8
Philippines  . 3.307  3.288  -0.6
Papua New Guinea  32  32  -0.3
Singapore  8,987  8.927  -0.7
Thailand  4,536  4.500  -0.8
South Asia  4.735  4.611  -2.6
Bangladesh  475  471  -0.7
Myanmar  18  18  -3.1
India  3,186  3.074  -3.5
Sri Ianka  491  487  -0.8
Pakistan  565  561  -0.6
Others
EFrA  13,360  13,146  -1.6
European Comnuuniy  84,762  83,562  -1.4
Japan  96.949  96,377  -0.6
Odher  Industrial  2/  9,623  9,527  -1.0
North Africa & Middle East  711  695  -2.3
South & Central America 3/  21.027  20,821  -1.0
1/  China was exduded from the East Asian totals due to the centrally planned  nature of this country's trade regime.
21  Austalia, New Zealand. Israel and Turkey.
3/  Excludes  Mexico.
Note:  The 1989 US inports were obtained from the UN COMTRADE  data base.
The gravity flow model suggests that East Asia's aggregate  trade diversion losses
will be in the order of $689 million annually  --close to the partial equilibrium  model's projection
of $384 million.'  For E  st Asia as a whole, this translates into a loss of about four-fifths of
X7 There is one imporan¶ difference  between  the two models.  China was excluded from the gravity flow
projections. Due to the centrally  planned  nature  of their trade regimes,  data for all the (present  and fonner) socialist
countries were excluded from tqe gravity model estimation  as the incorporation  of these countries in the analysis
would have severely  biased our rcsults (see Appendix  II).35
one percentage  point of its exports  to the United  States. These  losses  are at the lower  end of
the range  for all countries  (i.e, East  Asia  plus  others)  reflected  in Table  6 and are roughly  one-
third  those  projected  for South  Asia. 28
Thus, the main  message  that emerges  from the results  from the gravity  flow  and
partial  equilibrium  trade models  is that  the aggregate  impact  of NAFTA  on East Asia's trade is
likely  to be small  with less  than one percent  of total  exports  to the United  States  diverted?
V.  Summary  and Conclusions
While there has been considerable  apprehension  among many non-member
countries  about NAFTA's  trade diverting  effects,  the evidence  reported  in this study  suggests
that the impact  on East Asian  exporters  might  be small. Under  current  (pre-Uruguay  Round)
trade restrictions,  East  Asia's trade  diversion  is projected  to be between  $384 and $680  million
annually  with the latter figure representing  approximately  four-fifths  of one percent of the
region's  total  exports  to the  United  States. These  loss  projections  are probably  upwardly  biased
since they do not incorporate  any supply  constraints  on the capacity  6f Mexico  or Canada  to
expand  exports,  nor do they reflect  the influence  of NAFTA's  rules of origin  that could  limit
2'  Several  of the projections  reported  in Table  6 are in close  agreement  with  results from other studies. Using
a partial equilibrium model Erzan and Yeats (1992, Table 11) forecast an increase of 9.6 percent in Mexico's
exports to the United States following  a NAFTA agreement while Table 6 shows an increase of less than 2
percentage  points higher.  Safadi  and Yeats  (1992) focus  on the implications  of NAFTA for South Asian  countries
and conclude  that their potential  losses might approach  one to one and a half percent of total annual exports to the
United States.
29  The trade barrier parameters  of the gravity model  can be scaled to indicate  the influence  of changes in
North America's tariffs and NTBs  on trade of NAFTA members  and other countries. This exercise allows  one to
analyze the impact of a successful  completion  of the Uruguay Round on trade patterns.  For example, if the
implementation  of the Uruguay  Round  results reduce  US trade barriers by about  40 percent on average, East Asia's
trade losses  would  be about $410 million  as opposed  to $680  billion  under the existing  pre-Uruguay  Round  barriers.36
members' ability to fully capitalize on the agreement's trade preferences.
One way of placing the importance  of NAFTA in perspective is to compare the
projected  East AsiAS  NAFTA-induced  losses with estimates  of the export gains this region should
achieve as a result of a siuccessful  completion  of the Uruguay Round.  The World Bank (1992,
p. 52) estimates  that exports from East Asian low- and middle-income  economies  (i.e., all East
Asia less Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan (China) and OECD Asia) would increase by $16.3
billion annually under a 30 percent Uruguay Round reduction in trade barriers; an increase of
$27.1 billion is forecast for a 50 percent liberalization.  For these East Asian economies, the
gains  from the Uruguay  Pound results (which  are estimated  to fall in the above mentioned  range)
are 60 to more than 100 times the NAFTA-induced  losses estimated in this study.'
Finally, two qualifications  should  be noted conceniing  the results  that are reported
in  this study.  We  have assumed that NAFTA does not raise trade barriers  against third
countries.  In other words, we assumed that the member countries comply with GATr  Article
XXIV that requires 'the igeneral  incidence  of duties and regulations  affecting third  parties is no
higher after than it was Pefore the establishment  of the agreement." 3'  If this is not the case (as
the adoption of more restrictive riles of origin suggests), then the third country impact could
be more important than' indicated by our findings.  Second, it should be noted that we have
analyzed the influence :of NAFTA in  isolation of potentially related developments, and in
30  Actually,  these conparisons  overstte  the relative importance of NAFTA  since the implementation of the
Uruguay Round results will lower North American trade barriers and the preferences that can be extended to
NAFTA members. This will. in turn, reduce the value of third countries' exports that might be diverted.
"  Artice XXIV contqins  twro  other important  pmvisions relating  to the formation of FTAs: *_  duties and
other restrictive  regulations are eliminated  on subsantially ali trade between  partner countries; and the agreement
contins  a plan and schedule  for its complete  formation  within a reasonable Legth of iinme.'37
particular  have not attempted  to speculate  about  how it may infludnce  initiatives  for regionalism
elsewhere. If NAFTA  does accelerate  such  new initiatives,  its overall trade impact  could be
more important  than suggested  by our analysis.38
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Appendix I
Statistical Tables on East Asian Trade with NAFTA  Members44
Table Al:  Deslinadon  of East Asian  Exporf,  1990.
Rep.
Destination  of Exports  French  Hong  Indone-  of  Malay-  Philip-  Singa-  Taiwan,  Thai-  All East
China  Fiji  Polynesia  Kong  sia  Korea  Macau  sia  pines  Pore  China  land  Asia
(Value of 1990  reported total  exports in terns of USS mioion)
World  62,091  342  75  29,002  25,675  65,015  1,694  29,455  7.747  52.730  67,041  23.004  363,871
(Destinadon's  share in total  exporas  %)
World  100  100  10  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
North Amenca  9  9  23  32  14  33  38  18  42  22  34  24  25
EEC (12)  9  40  40  20  12  14  34  15  19  14  16  22  14
EFrA countries  I  --  3  4  --  3  4  1  1  1  2  2  2
OECD Asia  IS  37  23  7  45  21  5  18  21  12  15  19  18
East Asia  52  14  1  32  24  16  18  41  16  37  2.  21  30
Latin  Anerica & Caribbean  I  --  --  2  - 3  - I  - I  2  1  2
South  Asia  2  --  --  I  1  2  --  3  - 5  I  1  2
Middle  East  2  *-  --  1  3  3  2  1  2  2  5  2
Sub-Saharsn  Afrca  I  I  - - - I  I1  2  1
OLher  countries  8  10  I  1  4  1  1  - 5  2  3  4
Note: Statistics  for Fiji and French  Polynesia  are for 1988  while thosc  ror the Philippines  ar  tor 1989.
Two dashcs (.-) Indicate  zero or negligible.45
Table  A2: The  1990  Structure  of East  Asian  Exports  to the  United  States
French  Rep.  All
Polyne-  Hong  Indone  of  Malay-  Philip-  Sing3-  Taiwan,  Thi-  East
Product  (SITC)  China  Fiji  sia  Kong  sia  Korea  Macau  sia  pines  pore  China  land  Asia
(Value  of 1990  US  imports  in terms  of USS  million)
All goods  (O  to  9)  16,260  38  11  9,934  3,681  19,287  777  5,495  3,622  10.094  23.829  5.589  98,616
(Product  share  in the totld  -
All  gods (O  to9  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  too
Food  & Live  Animals  (0)  4  56  11  1  9  1  1  2  11  1  1  18  3
Beverages  & Tobacco  (I)  - - - - - - - - - -
Crude Materials  (2)  2  1  - - 14  - - 4  1  - - 2  1
Energy  products  (3)  4  - - - 27  - - 6  - 2  - 2  2
Animal  & Vegetable  Oils (4)  - - - - I  - - 2  4  - - - -
All  Manufactured  aoods (5 to 8)  90  42  83  95  48  98  99  84  82  92  97  75  91
Chemicals  (5)  2  --  I  I  I  I  - I  1  4  1  - 2
Leather Goods  (61)  - - - - - - - - - - - I  -
Rubber Manufactures  (62)  - - - 1  I  _  _  _  I  I  I
Wood  Manufactums  (63)  - 4  - I1  I  I  I  I  I  I
Yams & Fabrics  (65)  4  - --  2  2  3  - I  2  - Z  2  2
Irn  &  Sted  M(7)  - - - - - 3  - - --  - I  I  I
Nonferrmus  Metals (68)  1  --  - I  - - I  - - - - -
Transport  & Machinery  (7)  14  --  1  22  1  38  1  57  29  76  39  27  35
Nondeectzic  Machinery (71)  2  ..  8  - 10  - 6  3  47  18  10  13
Electrical  Machinery (72)  12  --  --  13  1  20  - 51  26  28  17  17  19
TransportEquipment  (73)  1  - I  --  --  7  - - I  1  4  - 3
Travel  Goods (83)  s  - --  I  - 2  1  - I  - 2  1  2
Clothing  (84)  23  37  --  43  19  18  57  12  32  7  11  9  18
Footwear(85)  9  - - 1  7  14  1  - I  --  6  S  7
Misc.  Manuractures  (89)  23  65  15  1  1l  36  8  7  3  14  18  1346
Table Al:  The  Thirty  Largest  Three-Digit  SITC  Products  Expofted  by East  Asia  to NAFrA
Share  of NAIFTA's  Imports from East Asia ()Value  of NAFTA Rcported  Imports (Smillion)
Product  (SITC)  1970  1980  1990  1970  1980  1990
Clothing not ot fur (841)  20  17  18  648  5,608  19,667
Ofrice  Machinery  (714)  1  1  12  2S  448  11,268
Electrical  Machinery  (129)  4  8  8  143  2,773  8,348
Telecommunications  Equipment  (724)  5  7  7  174  2.233  7,316
Foorwear  (851)  2  5  6  72  1,625  6,783
Toys and Sporting  Goods (894)  3  4  6  III  1,337  6,065
Sound  Recorders  (891)  2  1  2  8  274  2,449
Nonelectrical  Machinery  N.E.S. (719)  *-  1  2  2  353  2,090
Rnad Motor Vehicles  (732)  --  --  2  5  35  2,011
Trivel Goods (831)  1  2  2  39  564  2.005
Articles or Plastic  (893)  3  1  2  ItJI  351  1,991
Domestic  Electrical Equipment  (725)  --  1  2  2  300  1,989
Furniture (821)  1  1  2  Is  382  1,904
Electric Power Machinery  (722)  - I  2  10  283  1,722
Crude Petroleum  (331)  2  14  2  53  4,720  1,685
Other Manufactures,  N.E.S.  (899)  7  2  1  227  497  1,515
Scientific Instruments  (861)  --  I  I  8  246  1.401
Jewellery & Silverware  (897)  1  1  1  20  211  1,150
Metal Manufactures,  N.E.S. (698)  --  I  I  8  210  942
Plumbing  & Heating  Fixtures (812)  --  I  8  86  880
Woven  Textile  Fabrics  (653)  *-  - 1  12  133  836
Nonmotor  Road Vehicles  (733)  I  1  113  830
Watches  & Clocks  (864)  *-  2  1  7  545  821
Base metal Houschold  Appliances  (697)  --  I  I  IS  241  697
Steel  & Copper Nails, Bolts, etc. (694)  *-  --  I  2  130  696
Made-up  Textile Articles %6S6)  I  - I  22  137  676
Cotton Fabrics (652)  1  1  1  48  247  641
Pottery  (666)  *-  I  1  3  169  636
Rubber Articles  (629)  *-  I  1  2  222  614
Electrical Distribution  Equipment  (723)  - - I  14  95  613
All Above  Products  56  74  S4  1.808  24.574  90.241
Remaining  Products  44  26  16  1.417  8.486  16,769
Total Trade  100  100  100  3.225  33,060  107,01047
Appendix II
Description of the Partial  Equilibrium Trade and Gravity Flow Models Used to Simulate
the hnpact  of NAFFA on East Asian Exporters48
I The Partial  Equilibrium  Trade Model
The model, which is described in Laird and Yeats (1986). is a partial cquilibrium model similar
to that used by  Cline (1978) for evaluating the  Tokyo Round.  Two reduced form equations are estimated tO
calculate trade diversion separately for each market at the most detailed tariff-linc lcvel. 2
In  a  most-favored-nation (MFN)  based  liberalization, exporters  which previously cnjoyed
preferences surfer an erosion in tariff margins, whilc other exporters enjoy improved  market access.  Conversely,
as in the current exercise, the preferential  (FTA) liberalization  diverts trade away from those  suppliers  enjoying only
MFN treatment.  Furthermore, the preference margins of developing countries other than Mexico, e.g.,  the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and other special schemnes,  are eroded.
A. Elasticities
The key inputs  to the model  -besides trade flows. tariffs, and non-tariff barriers (NTBs)--are three
sets of elasticities:  (i) import (price) demand elasticities, (ii) elasticities of supply, and (iii) the cross (price)
elasticities of substitution.
For import demand  elasticities, we used what we judged to be the best estimates  available. 2 These
are not a consistent set in terms of estimation methods,  and the markets and specific years they pertain to.  Dcspite
these shortcomings, the elasticities broadly reflect the differences across products.  Nevartheless. wc tested the
sensitivity of our results by modifying  the vector of elasticities to reflect low and high case assumptions.
In the main (best case) scenario, we used an infinite  elasticity of suDplv  across the board.  As long
as increases in exports are incremental,  this may be a reasonable  assumption. For large increases, especially in the
ease of small countries, obviously this is not realistic.  In the absence of any reasonable estimate for these cases,
our check of this assumption was to do sensitivity analysis with a unitary and a finite elasticity within generally
accepted  ranges (see tables to this annex).
A critical input  is the cross elasticity  of substitution,  which  determines  the scope  of trade diversion.
This elasticity was assumed to be 1.5 for all products.  Estimates  of this elasticity are extremely sparse, and in any
case,  as any estimate  is specific to the product and the pairs of countries (or groups of countries) in question, there
are an immense number of possible  combinations.  In adopting a value for  the main scenario, we based our
judgment on our survey of the literature and in particular the work by Cline (1978)?
1 See also IMF (1984) and Sapir and Baldwin (1983) for sinmilar  model applications.  In these specification,
trade creation is the increase in total trade due to lowcr prices from reduced protection.  Trade diversion is the
substitution among suppliers as a result of changes in prices.  The summation  of trade creation and trade diversion
gives the net trade effect for each market.
2  See Cine  (1978), Laird and Yeats (1986), and Stem (1975).
'The model estimates trade creation (TCj) for product i from country  j using the following  expression,
TC1j  =  M- -c*dt/((l  +  td(1  - ed/e,))
where M 1, is the initial level of imports before the tariff cut and t is the initial tariff. In this equation ed is the import
demand elasticity while e, is the elasticity  of export supply. Trade diversion (TDij)  is sometimes  estimated using,
TDu  TC 1j -(M1/V;,)
where the  term in  parentheses is  the share of  imports from non-preference receiving countries in domestic
consumption of product i.  We use a slightly different formulation developed by Cline (1978) which utilizes a
consat  elasticiy of substitution  betweer.  imported products.49
B. The Treatment of NTBs
For the NAFTA  preferential  liberalization  scenarios,  we incorporated  estimates  of the ad wvlorem
equivalents  of NTBs directly in our data base and rcmoved  thcse rcstrictions  on NAFTA membcrs' cxports. Thc
primary source of data on NTB ad valorem  equivalents  was the survey by Laird and Ycats (1990) supplemented
by information  drawn from several US International  Trade Commission  studies.
C. Time Horizon
A  static  model mcasures the  impact of  an  exogenous change--in this  case  a  preferential
liberalization--in  tenns of short-term  adjustments. Thcse adjustments  typically  exclude instalment  of new capacity
and efficiency  gains in existing production  activities  as well as dhe  development  of new expoiEs. It is customary
to assume that the time horizon for these shortcr-term adjustmens is not much longer than a year.
D. Shortcomings  of the Model
It is useful to keep  in mind the following  shortconings of the partial equilibrium  model  used while
interpreting the results.
- It is a partial equilibrium  model, it omits economy-wide  and international  interactions
through production  activities.
- It is a static framework,  excluding investment,  technological  changes, and new product
lines. The counter-factual  for the model is that the pre-NAFTA trading environment  is
fundamentally  unchanged  (the samc counter-factual  applies to the gravity flow analysis.
- Because  of the static nature of the model, it is a relevant only to the short term.
- The crucial  elasticities  used are rough estimates.
- It essentially  deals  only with tariff cuts; the impact  of changes in NTBs are incorporated
only in a rudimentary  fashion.
Given these limitations, one might ask what is  the usefulness of the  exercise?  While the
computation  is basically an accounting-or summing  up-exercise, it does provide  orders of magnitude  of the short-
term impact of a FTA.  This is of value, given the large number of products involved  and the diversity of tariff
rates and preference margins.
I  The Gravity Flow Trade Model
In order to quantify  the effects  of NAFTA on the exports of the East Asian economies,  we also
rely on a gravity-type  equation . Gravity  models  have been applied successfully  to different types of flows, such
as migration, commuting, recreational  traffic, and interregional  and intemational  trade.  Typically, the log-linear
equation specifies  that a flow from origin i to destination  j can be explained  by supply conditions at the origin, by
demand conditions  at the destination,  and by economic  forces either assisting  or resisting the flow's movement!
In its basic form, the equation  is written as:
4 Tinbergen (1962) and P6yh6nen  (1963a,1963b)  were the first to apply the gravity equation to models of
bilateral trade flows (see Deardoff  (1984) for a survey). Their model was later extended  and applied to different
contexts  in bilateral trade by Linnemmnn  (1966), Aitkren  (1973), Hewett (1976), Pelznan (1977), Sapir (1981), and
Brada and Mendez (1983,1985).  The equation has been justified theoretically by Learer  and Stern (1970),
Anderson (1979), and Bergstrand  (1985, 1989). In fact, Linnemann  (1966) asserts that the gravity equation  can be
derived from a four-equation  partial equilibrium model of export supply and import demand, where prices are
excluded since they merely adjust to equate  supply and demand. This approach. howcevr, has been criticized by
Anderson (1979) and Leamer and Stern (1970).50
wbcre Tuj  is the US$  value of the flow from country i to country j. Y 1 and Y, arc, respectively, nominal  GDP in
country i and country j expressed in USS, D 1Q  is the distance from the economic  center of i to that of j, Al is any
other factor either assisting or resisting trade between  i and j. and e,, is a log-maornually  distributed  error term with
E(ln eiu)  =  0.
The most relevant applications  of the gravity equation in thc present context are those that used
it to quantify  the trade effects  of integration.  3 Our approach  is closely  related  to that of Pelzman (1977), and
Brada and Mendez  (1985).  Pelznian  investigated  the trade-creation  and tradc-diversioui  effects of the creation of
the Council for Mutua  Economiic  Assistance  (CMEA).  Hie  chose a pre-integration  period on the basis of which
equation  (1) was estimated. The eptimated  parmecters  were then used to predict  intra-CMEA  trade during the post-
integration  period.  The excess of actual inzra-CMEA  trade over the predicted  volume  of trade is attributed to the
effect of integration. Brada and Mendez attempted  to measure the effectiveness  of existing integration  schemes in
promoting  inter-member  trade.
While Pelzman's approach is acceptable  when analyzing  integration  schemes among countries of
similar characteristics;  it breaks down when one is confronted  with a heterogeneous  sample  of countries. Brada and
Mendez  reformulated  equation  (1) jy further  decomposing  the trade effects of an FTA into  environmental  and policy
effects.  Environmental  effects refer to the physical and economiic  characteristics  of the integrating  countries and
their relations with the rest of the world, while policy effects refer to the degree of trade liberalization  an FTA
engenders  among its members.  In order to capture these  effects, Brada and Mendez respecified  equation (1) as:
kogT?=A.s,llogy1 +a2logl¶1.a3logNI
*a41ogNJ+  i!5logD,VP 0 9-~oQQ  (2)
+7T  PUlog(Y/Nj)(Y/NP)
.Y 2 P9 .. ogD.  .oge
where  T 1 =  bilateral trade flows between  countries i and j
Yi, Yj ~  =  income in the exporting and importing countries
Ni.  Nj ~  =  population  in the exporting  and importing countries
Dili  ~~=  distapee  between  coutntries  i and j
Q  =2 and Pq  =I  if countries i and j belong to the same preference area and I and 0 reSpeCtively
otherwise  and,
Cij  is a log -nornnally  distributed  error termn  with E(In cij) =0.
Since our focus ina  the present  analysis is on the trade-diverting  effects of the NAFTA, rather than
just its trade-creating  effects, we  ewrite Brada and Mendez' equation (2) above as:
where T,, refers to bilateral  non-fuel import  values in US$. The US$ per capita GDPs at purchasing  power parity
for the reporter and the partner countries are included in order to capture the effects of each country's level of
development. The two variables  distance  between  countries (D1) and the corresponding  absolute  difference  in per
capita GDPs (at purchasing  power parity)- capture the Linder hypothesis  (1961) that the intensity  of bilateral trade
' Thse  applications include Tinbergen (1962), Aitken (1973), Hewett (1976), Haviylyshyn and Pritchett
(1991),  Pelzman (1977) and Erzap  and Safadi (1992).51
TV,  *A * a  logGDP,  . 21ogGDPi  a  ,Iog  GDPPC,
+  4IogGDPPC  + 'log  ( IGDPPC,  -GDPPCJ  I  I
+&,PulIog(GDPPC1)(GDPPC?  PI,Area,  (3)
+ P2&ea,  + PDU  + P. 4Border 1
+  PsPIlIogDy + yIlogQq  + yzLd2g8 + loge0
is determined  by similaritics  in demand  structures,  and geographical  distancc  between  importing  and cxporting
countries. The former  refers to the distance  between  the economic  centers  of the two countries,  and the later is
a proxy  for economic  similarity. The  size  of each  country  is measured  by area in square  kilometers,  and a separate
dummy  variable  is included  for the existence  of a common  border.  Again, Q 0 - 2 and P,J- I whenevcr  countries
i and j belong  to a common  trading  arran-ement,  and I and 0, respectively,  otherwisc. The trading  arrangements
included  are the EC, EFTA,  Latin  America  Free Trade  Area  (LAFTA),  and Caribbean  Common  Market  (CACM).'
The coefficient  ,  measures  the effect  of per capita  income  on the effectiveness  of integration.  The coefficient  y2
measurcs  the effect  of distance  on the trade augmenting  power  of an FTA. Finally, a language  dummy  variablc
(Lang,)  is included  as a proxy  for cultural  similarities.  It assumes  the value  of one if the  countries  share  a conmon
language,  otherwise  its value  is set to ze: , the languages  included  are English,  Spanish,  French  and Arabic.
In order to estimate  equation  3, we rely on the experience  of total non-fuel  import: (SITC 0
through  9 - 3) of 95 countries  from  each  other  during  the  year 1989  (the  latest  year for which  comprehensive  trade
data are available). The  estimated  coefficients  are then  used to project  the impact  of NAFTA  on the level  as well
as the origins  of che  US imports. In this exercise,  the  values  of Q,J  and P,J  are set to 2 and 1 respectively,  whenever
the import  partncr is either Canada  or Mexico,  and I and 0 otherwise. Moreover,  and in order to account  for the
fact  that the benchmark  integration  schemes  (EC, EFTA,  LAFTA  and CACM)  had an average  tariff of over 10%
prior to their formation,  while  the existing  average  tariff of US imports  from Canada  and Mexico  is 1.59%,  the
estimated  integration  elasticities  were scaled  down  by a factor  of six. Parameter  estimates  of the gravity  model  are
presented  in Table I below.
The empirical  performance  of the model  is quite  good. Nearly  all the variatles (except  for the
per capita  GDP of the reporter,  a3, and the FTA  distance  dummy,  fs  ') have the expected  sign and are strongly
significant.  Imports  increase  with  the level of GDP  of the reporter  and partner  (a, and a2), and decrease  with size
(6, and  12). Imports  also decrease  with distance  (,3) and  increase  with a common  border  (#3).  Sharing  a common
free  trading area (7y,)  enhances  trade  significantly,  and so does  sharing  a common  language  (y2). Finally,  a,  the
coefficient  that measures  the effect of per capita  income  on the effectiveness  of integration,  is positive. This
indicates  that inter-member  trade  increases  with  the level  of development  of the  integrating  countries,  thus  reflecting
the higher proportion  of tradeables  in their output.
6 For example,  Aitken  (1973)  found  European  trade  to be significantly  influenced  by membership  in the EC or
EFTA and by being  neighbors. Srivastava  and Green (1986)  found cultural  similarity,  political  circumstmces,
economic  union and former  colonial  status  to be significant  determinamts  of trade beween economies.
7 This coefficient  measures  the effect  of distance  on the trade-augmenting  power  of a free trade area.52
Table l: Gravity  Model  Estimates
Varialer  |  Standard |  T forHO,  H
Variable  Estimate  ExTor  I  Parameter =  0  I  Probability >0
Intercept  -26.38  1.77  -14.87  0.00
GDP,  1.35  0.03  38.68  0.00
GDPj  1.54  0.03  47.96  0.00
GDPPC,  -0.03  0.05  -0.58  0.56-
GDPPCJ  0.10  0.04  2.50  0.01
Per Capita
Difference  0.27  0.03  8.17  0.00
Per Capita
Product  0.37  0.09  4.02  0.00
Area,  -0.03  0.02  -14.35  0.00
Area 1 -0.29  0.02  -13.14  0.00
Distancej  -0.25  0.01  -19.26  0.00
Borderij  1.44  0.25  5.80  0.00
Border
Dummy  0.05  0.11  0.43  0.67'
ETA Dummy  7.12  1.70  4.18  0.00
LInRuSRe  1.59  0.12  12.87  0.00
(5 Not significant at the 1%.
Finally, since the values  of bilateral trade are only observed for nonnegative  values, ordinary least
squares estimates will be inconsistent.'  Therefore, we use the Tobit maximum likelihood  estimation technique.'
Furthermore, in predicting the trade effect of NAFTA, we follow McDonald and Moffit's (1980) methodology in
interpreting and using the estimated  Tobit coefficients. They show that:
E(fl-0 5 p',6/x,  X oUl  (4)
where o, and 4', are the density and distribution fimctions, respectively,  of the standard nonnal evaluated at  B'xf/c,
and or  is the standard error of estfmation. Table 6 in the main text presents the results.
'See  for example Maddala (1983) for a  discussion of the bias in OLS estimates in models with limited
dependent variables.  I
'See  Tobin (1958) and Heckman  (1976,1979) for a discussion and application of this technique.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Saries
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